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Abstract. Empirical evidence shows demand shocks tend to have an
asymmetric e⁄ect on output: it falls by a larger amount with a contraction than
it rises with an expansion. We argue that introducing nominal rigidities in a
framework where agents maximise their welfare can yield such an asymmetric
outcome. We show that this is the case in the Sticky Prices framework, where
each period an exogenously set fraction of ￿rms fails to adjust prices. While
the solution method commonly adopted by this literature, the log-linearization,
delivers a perfectly symmetric response, methods that respect the original struc-
ture of the model yield an asymmetric one. We show that when products are
good substitutes to each other and labour supply is inelastic, the model implies
that the response of output is larger with monetary contractions than with ex-
pansions, even when the shock is small. We identify the origin of the asymmetry
in that when not all ￿rms adjust prices, some goods are cheaper than others and
so more heavily consumed. With a positive shock, these goods are produced by
the ￿rms that fail to adjust, so that real income is not very much a⁄ected. But
with a negative shock, they are produced by ￿rms that adjust prices, causing a
large swing in real income.
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1. Introduction
An important stream of what has been called the New Keynesian synthesis has ex-
plained the link between monetary policy, in￿ ation and the business cycle by incor-
porating Keynesian elements (imperfect competition and nominal rigidities) into a
framework with optimizing agents. In particular, building on the work of Taylor
(1980) and Calvo (1983), models of staggered price adjustment1 (or Sticky Prices
Models) have addressed the issue by introducing these elements into the framework
traditionally associated with Real Business Cycle models. The result has been a class
of microfounded macroeconomic models in which sluggish price adjustment, by causing
non-neutral short-run e⁄ects of aggregate demand movements, provides an alternative
to ￿ uctuations in technology, intertemporal substitution and capital accumulation as
a cause for business cycle ￿ uctuations.
However, there is an important feature of monetary business cycles that these
models do not explain. Several empirical studies have reported evidence of asymmetric
e⁄ects of aggregate demand shocks on output. Macklem et al. (1996), Ravn and Sola
(2004) and Devereux and Siu (2005) ￿nd negative shocks have larger real e⁄ects than
positive ones. Cover (1992) ￿nds positive shocks have a weak contractionary e⁄ect
and negative shocks a large one.
Our objective is to show that the Sticky Prices framework can generate asymmetric
responses to shocks that are broadly consistent with the empirical results described
above. We argue that the introduction of nominal rigidities, by causing a substantial
reallocation of demand across goods, is at the origin of the asymmetric outcome of
the model. When not all ￿rms adjust their prices, some goods are cheaper than
the others and consumers direct their consumption towards the cheapest. When the
optimal price increases, the most consumed goods are those produced by the ￿rms that
fail to adjust their prices, so that real income is not very much a⁄ected. But when
the optimal price falls, the cheaper goods are those whose prices have been adjusted,
causing a large swing in real income. We show that when labour supply is inelastic
and products are good substitutes to each other2, this reallocation of demand causes
an asymmetric response of the optimal price, yielding a larger response of output with
negative shocks. The reallocation of demand that follows a change in prices is to be
found in an extended class of Sticky Prices models. But perhaps surprisingly, the
asymmetry generated is largely unreported.
This is so because Sticky Prices models generally rely on a ￿rst-order Taylor ex-
pansion based solution method (or log-linearisation). We show that log-linearising
around the steady state alters the basic properties of the aggregator of consumption
through which the mechanism that drives the asymmetry is channelled. Using solution
methods that respect the original (non-linear) structure of the equilibrium conditions
(hence do not rely on linear approximations) such as the projection methods develop
by Judd (1992) or the parameterised expectations approach of Den Haan and Marcet
(1990), the true outcome of the model is revealed. We report important qualitative and
quantitative di⁄erences between the log-linearised and the non-linearised solutions.
Economists often argue that nominal rigidities are asymmetric: prices are more
1e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000; Goodfriend and King,
1997; Gal￿, 2002; or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) to cite a few.
2These parameter values are widely accepted by microeconomic empirical studies.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 3
￿ exible when going up than when going down. Often these asymmetries are simply as-
sumed, or rely on an irrational aversion to nominal wage or price decreases. However,
agents in the models we present are fully rational3. Several papers in the New Keyne-
sian literature have tried to o⁄er a theoretical account of the asymmetric response to
shocks that is based on optimising behaviour. Tsiddon (1993) and Ball and Mankiw
(1994) present models in which positive trend in￿ ation causes asymmetric price re-
sponses. But the models we present do not assume trend in￿ ation. Devereux and Siu
(2005), in the context of a state-dependent pricing model ￿nd a distinct asymmetry
in the response of prices. But our results do not rely on any form of strategic linkage
between ￿rms.
We ￿rst present the model, and analyse the implications of the failure of some ￿rms
to adjust their prices to a one-o⁄aggregate demand shock in the static counterpart of
a standard Sticky Prices model. The static analysis lays the intuition surrounding the
mechanisms that drive the asymmetric outcomes of the model. We then explain why
the log-linearisation fails to reveal them. We study next the outcome of a standard
dynamic Sticky Prices model based on the widely used pricing mechanism introduced
by Calvo (1983). To establish the connection with the static analysis, we ￿rst study
a particular case where ￿rms maximise myopic pro￿ts. We show that with a small
1% nominal shock, the ￿rst period response of output is 36% larger with the negative
shock. We then introduce forward-looking behaviour, and show that because the
response of the optimal price is more limited in this case, the asymmetry in the response
of output has reduced: it is only 20% larger with the negative shock.
2. A Standard Sticky Prices Model
The economy is populated by a representative and in￿nitely lived household, and a
large number of identical ￿rms. The household consumes di⁄erentiated products, each
of which is produced by a di⁄erent ￿rm. The representative household and the ￿rms
interact in a monopolistically competitive goods market and a perfectly competitive
labour market. Because the goods market is monopolistically competitive, ￿rms take
as given downward sloping demand schedules for their products, and set the prices
that maximise their pro￿ts. A fundamental friction is added to this economy: each
period a fraction of ￿rms fails to adjust their prices, keeping the one that was set in the
previous period and thus failing to maximise pro￿ts. This pattern of price adjustment
is known in the literature as the Calvo pricing mechanism (from Calvo (1982)). The
basic experiment we perform is letting the amount of money change unexpectedly, and
recording the response of the economy as it switches from the pre to the post-shock
equilibrium.
2.1. Households. The household￿ s maximisation program can be staged in two
steps. First it maximises its overall utility, deciding how much to consume of an
aggregate of consumption ct that we de￿ne below, how much to work, lt, and how




















3Although some ￿rms fail to maximise their pro￿ts, this is not generally deemed irrational behav-
iour.4 C. Ibanez



















where ￿ is the discount factor, ft the real dividends the consumer receives from the
￿rms, wt the real wage rate and Pt the aggregate price level, de￿ned further on.
Tt = ~ Mt ￿ ~ Mt￿1 are money transfers, taken as given by the household. Note that
although ~ Mt equals Mt in equilibrium (because the agent is a representative one),
the ￿rst one is taken as given by the household while the second is a choice variable.
Further, the household also takes as given the wage rate, the dividends paid out by
￿rms and the aggregate price level. We choose a separable functional form for the
utility as is commonly adopted by the Sticky Prices literature (e.g. Gal￿ (2002)). The
rest of the model￿ s structure draws on Cooley and Hansen (1989). The ￿rst-order
conditions of the Lagrangian associated with the above program, with the constraints
holding with equality, are given by the labour Euler equation,
a ￿ l
￿￿l
t = ￿t ￿ wt (4)









and the consumption Euler equation,
c
￿￿c
t = ￿t + ￿t (6)
where ￿t and ￿t are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget and cash in
advance constraints respectively. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is again given
by ￿ = ￿1=￿l
4. When ￿l ! 0, the utility function is linear in labour, and so the labour
supply schedule is in￿nitely elastic. But as ￿l falls, labour supply becomes increasingly
inelastic, so that large changes to the wage rate are needed for the household to change
the amount of labour it is willing to provide.
In a second stage the household seeks to allocate optimally his aggregate level of
consumption across a range of di⁄erentiated products taking as given the products￿
prices (pi;t , i 2 [0;1]) and its available level of expenditure, that we set exogenously.
The household￿ s preferences over the di⁄erentiated products it consumes are charac-
terised by a constant elasticity of substitution function, commonly known as Dixit-











4￿l ￿ 0 needs to be satis￿ed for the second order derivative of the objective to be negative and so
our maximum to be an internal solution.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 5














pi;t ￿ ci;t ￿ di ￿ Et (8)
where Et is nominal aggregate demand and it is exogenous to the model. We de￿ne
a price level Pt as the ratio of nominal to real aggregate demand, Pt = Et=ct. The
parameter ￿ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two goods (￿ > 1)
and goods are perfect substitutes to each other when ￿ ! 1. Substituting (7) in this
expression we obtain
ci;t = [￿t ￿ pi;t]
￿￿ ￿ ct (9)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier of the maximisation problem. Substituting this









which is an expression for the multiplier as a function of the prices. Substituting the

















The demand for good i depends negatively on the good￿ s price (this is called the
own-price e⁄ect), positively on all the other goods prices (the cross-price e⁄ect) and
positively on real aggregate demand (or aggregate consumption, c). It is now possible
to construct a relation between the aggregate price level Pt, and the products￿prices
(pi;t , i 2 [0;1]). Combining the de￿nition of the price level (Pt = Et=ct) with (10) and
















￿ ct i 2 [0;1] (12)
These downward sloping demand schedules are taken as given by the ￿rms when choos-
ing their prices. We turn now to examine these.
2.2. Firms. The ￿rms￿production function is linear in labour (yi;t = li;t, where yi;t
is production and li;t is labour employed), and so the ￿rms￿marginal cost is simply
given by the real wage rate. After substituting the demand functions (12) the ￿rms
take as given, we can write the expression for the real pro￿ts made by each ￿rm i,













Each period, some of the ￿rms fail to adjust their prices to the one that maximises their
pro￿ts. The decision to adjust is taken when the ￿rms receive a price changing signal,
which comes every period with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Those ￿rms that do not receive the
signal keep their posted prices. This pricing mechanism is due to Calvo (1983) and
it greatly simpli￿es the setting and solution of the model. First, because the pricing
signal is a random variable with a memoryless distribution, the probability to adjust in
any given period does not depend on the ￿rms￿past decisions. Moreover, because there
are a large number of ￿rms, the law of large numbers implies that the fraction of ￿rms
that each period keep their prices ￿xed is equal to the probability of not receiving the
signal (￿ that is). Last, the probability of adjustment can be related to the length of
time ￿rms keep their prices ￿xed on average, given by (1 ￿ ￿)
P1
k=0 k￿k￿1 = 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
Firms want the price they set today p
opt
i;t , to maximise not only current pro￿ts but
also those future expected pro￿ts that depend on it. When choosing the optimal price
in period t ￿rms know they might not do so in the following periods. They therefore

























where ￿ = 1=(￿￿1) is the markup over the marginal cost when ￿rms maximise myopic
pro￿ts. Note that because the left hand side is equal across ￿rms, we have dropped the
subscript i: all adjusters set the same price. When ￿rms consider the path of future
variables in the price they set, the current in￿ ation rate is a⁄ected by expectations
of future variables. An important case we examine in the following sections is given
when the discount factor is set to 0, and so the optimal price is given by
p
opt
t = (1 + ￿)Ptwt (14)
2.3. Characterisation of the Equilibrium. After the exogenous money stock
~ Mt changes unexpectedly, the representative household decides how much to consume
of each one of the di⁄erentiated goods taking as given the prices, and how much labour
to supply taking as given the real wage rate. Conditional on receiving a price changing
signal, ￿rms decide upon what price to set and how much labour to demand, taking
as given the demand they face and the level of aggregate variables. After household
and ￿rms trade goods and labour, aggregate variables settle to their new equilibrium
values. In equilibrium the amount of money available to the consumer is equal to theAsymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 7
amount held the previous period plus the transfers Tt, and so we have that Mt = ~ Mt.
The exogenously set money stock ~ Mt evolves according to
~ Mt = gt ￿ ~ Mt￿1 (15)
where gt is a stochastic process whose logarithm follows a NID(0;￿2) distribution. It
can be shown5 that choosing ￿c = 1 (utility function logarithmic in consumption) as
shall be the case hereafter, both constraints hold with equality under mild restrictions
on the process of gt and the discount factor ￿. The cash in advance constraint holds












= exp(￿2=2) and 0 < ￿ < 1,
so the ￿rst condition is satis￿ed when ￿ is small enough. When the cash-in-advance
constraint holds with equality, we have that
ct = ~ Mt=Pt
Notice that this expression is identical to the relation between real aggregate demand
and the price level we de￿ne above (ct = Et=Pt), if we substitute available expenditure
by the level of the money stock and ignore the time subscripts. Therefore, a change in
the money stock in this model is equivalent to a change in nominal aggregate demand.
Combining this expression with the law governing the evolution of the money stock
(15) allows us to write a relation between output, in￿ ation, and the monetary shock:
ct = gt ￿
~ Mt￿1
Pt￿1
￿ (1 + ￿t)
￿1 (16)
where ￿t is in￿ ation, de￿ned as the aggregate price level￿ s growth rate. Thus, the
cash in advance constraint describes an inverse relation between output and in￿ ation,
conditional on the shock and the value of the previous period￿ s real money balances.









allows us to write the equilibrium labour supply schedule as





Next, since labour is a homogenous good, it is naturally aggregated linearly, and its





Equilibrium in the goods market is reached when the quantity supplied of each good
covers its demand, yi;t = ci;t. We have that integrating the left hand side of this
condition over the continuum of goods and using the ￿rms￿production function and







5The proof is available on request from the author.8 C. Ibanez













￿ ct ￿ di = R
￿
















The aggregate labour demand schedule can thus be written
lt = R
￿
t ￿ ct (18)
The Calvo pricing mechanism allows the possibility of summarizing the whole history
of prices set in the past in a single variable, the past aggregate price level Pt￿1. In
period t, a constant proportion ￿ of ￿rms sets the price they posted the previous period
and the rest sets the nominal optimal price p
opt
t . In period t ￿ 1, ￿ set the price they
posted the previous period and the rest set p
opt
t￿1, and so on. In period t we have that:
(1 ￿ ￿) set p
opt
t , ￿(1 ￿ ￿) set p
opt
t￿1, ￿2(1 ￿ ￿) set p
opt
t￿2, and so on. We can use this





























We can now de￿ne an equilibrium in this economy as a function of the shock to
nominal aggregate demand and the exogenously set fraction ￿ of adjusters:
De￿nition 1. an equilibrium in this economy is a collection of allocations for the
representative household ct, lt, ci;t for i 2 [0;1]; allocations for ￿rms li;t for i 2 [0;1];
together with prices wt, Pt, p
opt
t that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking prices
as given, consumer allocations solve the household￿ s problem, satisfying (4), (5) and
(6), (ii) taking all prices but his own as given adjusters satisfy (13) or (14), while
non-adjusters keep their posted prices; the factor markets clear implying that (16),
(17), (18), (19) and (20) ought to be satis￿ed.
3. Consumer Choice Analysis
We explain now why the model we have just presented can yield an asymmetric re-
sponse of real aggregate demand (ct, equal to output in this model). Because we work
with a general equilibrium framework, it is di¢ cult to identify the causal links between
the di⁄erent variables. Changes in prices a⁄ect real variables when some ￿rms fail to
adjust prices and changes in real variables a⁄ect prices through their in￿ uence on prof-
its. In section 3.1 we break this circle by assuming a perfectly symmetric change in
the optimal price: it falls by as much with a contraction in nominal demand as it rises
with an expansion. In this partial equilibrium scenario we show how the response of
real variables is larger with a contraction in nominal aggregate demand than with anAsymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 9
expansion. We also show how the reallocation of consumption from more expensive
to cheaper goods is at the origin of this asymmetric pattern. In section 3.2 we show
that under certain circumstances, the asymmetric pattern described by real variables
is also followed by the optimal price. As a result, we ￿nd that real aggregate demand
falls by more than it rises with a shock, while the opposite is the case for aggregate
labour, the price level and the real wage rate Throughout the following two sections
we consider only the ￿rst period after the shock, and we let ￿rms maximise myopic
pro￿ts. We then drop all time subscripts and let the optimal price be given by (14)
rather than (13). The model we examine is then in all respects static. We consider
the dynamic implications of our analysis in section 5.
3.1. Origin of the Asymmetry. We examine here how the consumer￿ s optimal
allocation of consumption across the goods it wishes to consume determine asymmetric
patterns for the responses of real aggregate demand and aggregate labour to nominal
changes. These two magnitudes are aggregates of the same household￿ s demands for
the di⁄erent goods. However, these demands are aggregated di⁄erently, and as we show
in section 3.2, the wedge driven between the two aggregates is crucial to understanding
the model￿ s outcome. We assume ￿rst a perfectly symmetric change in the optimal
price and study the forces that this change generates. At the end of the section we show
how a very particular choice of parameter values justi￿es our assumption in general
equilibrium.
a. Optimal allocation of Consumption. A typical household in this economy,
faced with a distribution of prices and a given level of available expenditure, allocates
optimally his consumption across the goods it wishes to consume. After the shock to
nominal aggregate demand, a fraction ￿ of ￿rms adjust prices and so receive the same
demand for their products (cadj = (popt=P)￿￿c), while the rest keep their posted prices














This is both a measure of utility derived from consumption and the level of real aggre-
gate demand. We can consider the problem in terms of a traditional consumer choice

















that gives all the combinations cadj and ckee yielding a c level of real aggregate demand
(the indi⁄erence curve). Performing the same operation with the budget constraint of












Here Ek is available expenditure to a typical household k, that we hold ￿x in our







































































































Figure 1: Hicks decomposition of the e⁄ect of changes in the optimal price on the
optimal allocations of consumption (A+, B+ for a rise and A￿, B￿ for a fall).Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 11
adjusters￿goods) on the household￿ s choices. We have represented in ￿gure 1 the
changes in the optimal allocation of consumption for a fall and a rise (of equal size) of
the optimal price while keeping Ek ￿xed.
The budget constraint pivots from its original position (through O) upwards with a
fall in popt and downwards with an increase. Starting from the allocations at O, where
all prices are the same an increase in the optimal price leads to B+ while a decrease
leads to B￿. We have also represented in the ￿gure the Hicksian decomposition into
income and substitution e⁄ects of a change in prices. The change from O to A+ and
A￿ is caused by the substitution e⁄ect, while the change from A+ to B+ and from A￿
to B￿ is caused by the income e⁄ect of the price change6.
As can be appreciated from the ￿gure, the change in real aggregate demand (the
shift in the indi⁄erence curve) from A+ to B+ is substantially smaller than the change
from A￿ to B￿. The di⁄erence is wholly attributable to the income e⁄ect of the price
change, since the substitution e⁄ect by de￿nition causes no change in real aggregate
demand and so allocations are on the original indi⁄erence curve. When prices increase
the goods whose price has changed are relatively poorly consumed, since they are more
expensive. When prices decrease, this has a large e⁄ect because the goods whose price
has changed are consumed to a large extent, since they are now the cheapest. The
income e⁄ect on real aggregate demand of a decrease in the optimal price is larger
than the income e⁄ect of an increase.
b. General Equilibrium Response. Let us now consider the general equilib-
rium e⁄ects of a change in nominal aggregate demand E. We start with the determi-
nants of the optimal price in (14). Because ￿rms are monopolistic competitors, they
set this price at a constant markup over the nominal marginal cost (P ￿ w). In this
section, we set ￿c = 1 so that utility is logarithmic in consumption, and ￿l = 0 so
that labour supply is in￿nitely inelastic. In this case the the equilibrium labour supply
schedule (17) is given by w = a￿c and so the real wage rate is independent of aggregate
labour in equilibrium. Substituting the relation between real and nominal aggregate
demand (c = E=P) we obtain P ￿w = a￿E. Thus, with a shock to nominal aggregate
demand, the optimal price changes by the same amount as the shock. A symmetric
change in E then causes a symmetric change in popt, justifying the perfectly symmetric
optimal price response we have assumed so far in our analysis.
We explained above why a symmetric change in the optimal price has an asym-
metric e⁄ect on real aggregate demand, holding the household￿ s available expenditure
￿xed. Let us now consider the e⁄ect of a change in available expenditure -equal to
nominal aggregate demand- on real aggregate demand, taking as given the change in
the optimal price. When E increases, the household￿ s budget constraint (8) shifts up,
causing an increase in the amount consumed of all goods and so in real aggregate
demand7, proportionally to the increase in E. When E falls, the opposite happens,
and the amount consumed of all goods and real aggregate demand fall proportion-
ally. Therefore, a symmetric change in E causes a symmetric change in real aggregate
demand.
6The line through the origin, A+ and B+, and the line through the origin and A￿ and B￿ are the
income expansions paths, since the indi⁄erence curves are convex to the origin.
7That again is a characteristic of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.12 C. Ibanez
Let us ￿nally combine the e⁄ect of a change in available expenditure with the
e⁄ects of a change in the optimal price. Both changes have opposing e⁄ects on real
aggregate demand: the change in the optimal price limits the e⁄ects of the change in
available expenditure. But because the change in the optimal price has asymmetric
e⁄ects on real aggregate demand, we have that an increase in E is only limited to a
small extent by an increase in the optimal price, while a decrease in E is limited to a
large extent by a decrease in the optimal price. As a result, an expansion in nominal
aggregate demand has larger e⁄ects on real aggregate demand than a contraction.
We have represented the responses of optimal price and real aggregate demand to a
range of nominal demand shocks in ￿gure 2. The solid lines correspond to the response
to a positive shock while the dashed ones give the absolute value of the response to a
negative shock. While the response of the optimal price is perfectly symmetric (dashed
line coincides with the solid one), the response of real aggregate demand is asymmetric,
and this asymmetry grows with the size of the shock.
The size of the asymmetry depends crucially on the value of the elasticity of substi-
tution. The better substitutes products are, the larger the extent to which the house-
hold substitutes consumption from the most expensive to the cheaper goods after the
optimal price changes. The more intense the reallocation of demand, the weaker the
income e⁄ect of the optimal price change is with an expansion and the stronger with a
contraction. Thus, the larger the elasticity of substitution is, the larger the size of the
asymmetry. To see that, consider the extreme case where goods are perfect substitutes
to each other and so the elasticity of substitution tends to in￿nity. With a contraction
in nominal aggregate demand and so a fall in the optimal price, the household stops
consuming altogether the most expensive goods (produced by non-adjusters), since an
equivalent alternative exists at cheaper prices. With an expansion, it is the goods pro-
duced by adjusters that are consumed no longer. As a result, a contraction leaves real
aggregate demand una⁄ected. But with an expansion, real aggregate demand changes
by the full amount of the shock.
As can be appreciated from ￿gure 2, the size of the asymmetry in the response of
aggregate labour is larger than that of real aggregate demand. We proceed now to
analyse the di⁄erence between the two responses, a di⁄erence that is fundamental to
understanding the general equilibrium response of the optimal price that we analyse
in the following section. Both labour and output are aggregates of the same individual
demands and the linear aggregator of labour is a special case (when ￿ ! 1) of the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of consumption. The equilibrium condition (18) in the static
context we are examining is given by l = R￿ ￿ c. The following proposition establishes
a key property of the relation between the two aggregates.
Proposition 2. The ratio of the two price aggregators is larger than one whenever
some ￿rms set a di⁄erent price than the others: R > 1 if popt 6= ￿ p.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, we have that l > c and so the response of labour exceeds output￿ s with
a positive shock falls short of it with a negative one (^ l+ > ^ c+ and ^ l￿ > ^ c￿). As a
result the asymmetry of in the response of labour is larger than in the response of real
aggregate demand.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 13
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Figure 2: General equilibrium responses to a range of nominal shocks when labour
supply is in￿nitely elastic, ￿l = 0 (￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 7:7).
3.2. The Asymmetry in the response of the optimal price. The analysis in
the previous section ￿rst assumed a symmetric response of the optimal price, and then
presented general equilibrium results for a particular set of parameter values (￿c = 1,
￿l = 0) for which the response of the optimal price was actually symmetric. We con-
cluded in this setting that the response of real aggregate demand is larger with positive
shocks than with negative. We also found that the response of labour systematically
exceeds output￿ s with a positive shock and falls short of it with a negative one.
We now let labour supply become more inelastic (j￿lj to increase) and show how
our results can change dramatically. We have represented in ￿gure 3 the response of
real aggregate demand for two alternative values of ￿l. When ￿l = ￿1 the asymmetric
pattern is as described in the previous section: real aggregate demand response is larger
with positive shocks. But when ￿l = ￿3, the asymmetric pattern has reversed: the
response is now larger with negative shocks. Moreover, the response to both positive
and negative shocks is considerably smaller. We show now how when labour supply
is su¢ ciently inelastic, the asymmetric patterns described in the previous section are
channelled into an asymmetric response of the optimal price, and how this causes real
aggregate demand￿ s asymmetric pattern to reverse.
Let us consider again the determinants of the optimal price (14) in equilibrium. It
is set at a constant markup over the marginal cost, the wage rate in our model. In
equilibrium, the real wage rate is governed by the consumer￿ s ￿rst order condition (17)14 C. Ibanez

























Figure 3: Response of real aggregate demand to a range of shocks for alternative values
of the elasticity of labour supply ￿ = ￿1=￿l (￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 7:7).
that we rewrite here for convenience
w = a ￿ l
￿￿l ￿ c
￿c (21)
The response of the real wage rate to a change in nominal demand depends on the
responses of aggregate labour and real demand and their respective weights (￿￿l and
￿c). If we retain ￿c = 1 so that utility is logarithmic in consumption, and we let labour
supply become more inelastic (j￿lj to increase) the response of the optimal becomes
asymmetric.
We have represented in ￿gure 4 the response of the optimal price for two alternative
values of the elasticity of labour supply. Setting ￿l = 0 as in the previous section,
labour supply is in￿nitely elastic and the response of the optimal price is perfectly
symmetric: solid lines are identical in absolute value for positive and negative shocks.
But the income e⁄ect of these changes in the optimal price (solid lines) is asymmetric.
The income e⁄ect of the fall in the optimal price is larger in absolute value than the
income e⁄ect of an identical rise. As we have explained, the better substitutes products
are (larger ￿), the larger the asymmetry in the income e⁄ect. As households substitute
consumption to a larger extent to the cheaper goods, real aggregate demand is a⁄ected
to a greater extent by a fall in the optimal price and to a lesser extent by an increase.
Let us consider now these same general equilibrium responses when labour supply
is inelastic. As before, we choose ￿l = ￿6:7 so that the elasticity of labour supply
is given by ￿ = 0:15. In this case, aggregate labour carries a larger weight than real
aggregate demand in determining the equilibrium real wage rate in (21). We have
represented the response of the optimal price to ￿5% shocks to nominal aggregate
demand in ￿gure 4 (dashed lines). The response of the optimal price is now clearly
asymmetric: in absolute value, it is larger with a positive shock than with a negative
one. Moreover, the asymmetry increases the better substitutes products are (larger
￿). This very same pattern, as discussed in section 3.1 is followed by the response of
aggregate labour. Precisely because aggregate labour carries a large weight in (21) theAsymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 15
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Figure 4: General equilibrium response of the optimal price and its income e⁄ect to
’ = ￿5% shocks for ￿l= ￿6:7 and ￿l= 0, as a function of ￿ (￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5).
real wage rate describes this asymmetric pattern that carries through to the optimal
price. Thus, large values of j￿lj and ￿ are essential for the response to a positive shock
to be substantially larger than the response to a negative shock. When ￿ is large, the
response of aggregate labour is highly asymmetric, and when j￿lj is large this response
is translated to a larger extent to the response of the optimal price.
As before, the income e⁄ect of this response is asymmetric, but the pattern has
now reversed. The income e⁄ect of the change in the optimal price (dashed lines) is
larger with a positive shock than with a negative one, and the asymmetry grows with
the elasticity of substitution. The forces driving the result we described in the previous
section are still at play, but the asymmetry in the optimal price that these same forces
generate moves against them. Because of the asymmetry in the income e⁄ect of the
change in the optimal price, real aggregate falls further with a negative shock than it
rises with a positive one. Moreover, because the response of the optimal price is very
large when labour supply is inelastic, so is its income e⁄ect and real aggregate demand
su⁄ers a more limited response to both positive and negative shocks.
We represent in ￿gure 5 the response of aggregate labour, real wage rate, optimal
price and real aggregate demand to a range of nominal shocks (0 to 5%). The dashed
lines give (minus) the response to a negative shock and the solid lines the response
to a positive one. As before, the distance between the two curves gives us the size of
the asymmetry and the position its direction. As in Ball and Romer (1990), we have
chosen ￿ = 7:7 and ￿l = ￿6:7. This value of the elasticity of substitution is commonly
adopted by the New-Keynesian literature, although sometimes larger values are chosen
(see Goodfriend, M. and King, R. (1997)), and it implies a markup over the marginal
cost before the shock of 15%: The value we choose for ￿l implies a Frisch elasticity of
labour supply of ￿ = 0:15, which is in line with several microeconomic studies that have
estimated it8. However, both the real business cycle and new Keynesian literatures
8MaCurdy (1981), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), using variation in hours
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Figure 5: General equilibrium responses to a range of shocks when labour supply is
inelastic, ￿l = ￿6:7 (￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 7:7).
typically use larger values for this parameter: around ￿ = 1, so that ￿l = ￿1. We keep
these parameter values in the remainder of the paper.
The response of aggregate labour is larger with an expansion in nominal aggregate
demand than with a contraction, and the size of the asymmetry grows with the absolute
value of the shock. The real wage rate follows this same pattern (because labour supply
is considerably inelastic) and so does then the optimal price. As we have explained,
the income e⁄ect of the change in the optimal price is therefore also stronger with
positive than with negative shocks. As a result, real aggregate demand displays a
larger response with negative shocks than with positive ones. It is also important
to note that in the event of a large positive shock, real aggregate demand su⁄ers
a negative response. This is so because the optimal price has experienced a large
response, following that of the real wage rate. We can trace back this result to our
choice of parameter values: labour supply being considerably inelastic, small changes in
labour are associated with large movements in the real wage rate. Thus, the qualitative
outcome of the model of the model di⁄ers not only with the sign of the shock, but
also with its size. With small (￿1%) shocks, real aggregate demand su⁄ers a small
asymmetric response (￿0:13%;0:10%). With large (￿5%) shocks, the asymmetry has
grown disproportionately (￿0:86%;￿0:29%) and the response to a positive shock has
become negative.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 17






































































Figure 6: Linear and non-linear responses to shocks (￿l = ￿6:7, ￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5).
4. Shortcomings of the Linearisation
The Sticky prices literature does not generally provide a solution to the original struc-
ture of the model. It o⁄ers instead the solution to an approximated version of the
model, obtained by taking a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of the equilibrium condi-
tions. This procedure is called log-linearisation and it delivers by construction a per-
fectly symmetric response to shocks. We examine in this section the quantitative
and qualitative di⁄erences between the true (non-linear) outcome of the model and
the approximated (log-linear) one. We have represented in ￿gure 6 the actual and
log-linearised9 responses to symmetric shocks to nominal demand. The dotted lines
give the perfectly symmetric log-linearised responses: the response to a positive shock
matches the absolute value to the negative one, so both lines coincide. Because the
actual response is asymmetric, the log-linearised one lies between the true positive
and negative ones. The gap between them is apparent for su¢ ciently large shocks
(larger than 1%). We proceed now to explain why such quantitative and qualitative
di⁄erences occur.
As we exposed in section 2.1, the composition of the aggregate price level is derived
from combining demand functions with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of consumption.
The household￿ s preferences over goods can then be derived from the aggregate price
level￿ s structure. The log-linearisation procedure fails to reveal the true implications
of the model we have introduced because it distorts the true outcome of the aggregate
price level. This is because the log-linearisation e⁄ectively eliminates the in￿ uence
9The log-linearised solution is given in the appendix.18 C. Ibanez
the elasticity of substitution has on the weight of the di⁄erent prices in the overall
composition of the aggregate price level. The aggregate price level is a constant-
elasticity of substitution function (given by 19) that we rewrite here for convenience
P =
n
￿ ￿ (￿ p)





The importance of the di⁄erent prices in the overall value of the aggregate price level
is governed by the parameters ￿ (fraction of ￿rms that fail to adjust) and ￿ (elasticity
of substitution). Taking a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion around the steady state allows
us to write the expression for the approximate response of the aggregate price level to
the monetary shock:
^ P ’ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ^ p
opt (22)
Notice that the parameter ￿, the elasticity of substitution, has disappeared from the
expression relating the prices set by the di⁄erent ￿rms and the aggregate price level
(￿ p is a constant and so disappears from the expression). The weight the response of
the di⁄erent prices carry in the response of the aggregate price level is then solely
governed by ￿, and so the log-linearisation eliminates the channel through which the
model delivers an asymmetric outcome. To illustrate how the elasticity of substitution
a⁄ects the gap between the true value of the aggregate price level and its Taylor
approximation, we graph both in ￿gure 7, ￿xing the response of the adjusters￿price
to ^ popt = +5% and ^ popt = ￿5%.
The thick lines (P + and P ￿) represent the true responses of the aggregate price
level, while the dashed ones ( ^ P + and ^ P ￿) are the ￿rst-order Taylor expansions, given
by (22). As the parameter ￿ grows, the gap between the outcome produced by a ￿rst-
order Taylor expansion and the true value increases substantially. To understand why,
take the limit of the aggregate price level as ￿ approaches the extreme values it can
take (￿ > 1). When ￿ approaches one, the aggregate price level is given by:
lim
￿!1





A ￿rst-order Taylor expansion in this case gives a full account of the aggregate price
level￿ s response (higher order expansions add no information). In this case then, the
log-linearised solution portrays the model accurately. But when ￿ approaches in￿nity







In this case the log-linearised version of the aggregate price level is most inaccurate.
The true response of the aggregate price level to a monetary contraction is ^ P = ^ popt
and the true response to an expansion is ^ P = 0, while the log-linearised response
is yielded by (22), an average of the two. The gap between the ￿rst-order Taylor
expansion and the true aggregate price level is arbitrarily large in this case. Therefore,
taking a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of the constant elasticity of substitution function
will only be a valid option when the goods consumed are highly di⁄erentiated (low ￿).
It is interesting to point out here that a second order Taylor expansions, representedAsymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 19


























Figure 7: Response of the price level when ^ popt = ￿5% as a function of ￿. P is the
true value of the price level, ^ P is the ￿rst order approximation and ~ P is the second
order approximation.
in ￿gure 7 by ~ P + and ~ P ￿, does not always improve the quality of the approximation.
While it does for a fall in the optimal price, it does not for an increase.
The fact that a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion eliminates the elasticity of substitution
from the composition of the aggregate price level has further consequences. Because
linearising the two alternative price aggregators - P given by (19) and P ￿ given by
(20)- yields identical expressions, the log-linearisation eliminates the ratio R from
the relation between labour and consumption. This alters signi￿cantly the relation
between labour and consumption and hence the determination of the equilibrium wage
rate. Recall equation (18) related aggregate employment and aggregate output as:
l = R
￿ ￿ c
Linearising this expression gives:
^ l ’ ^ c
Because R is eliminated from the expression when taking a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion,
the literature generally dismisses its importance. But the fact is that large values of
the elasticity of substitution cause it to signi￿cantly a⁄ect the relation between labour
and consumption. While in steady state the ratio is equal to one, we have shown in
proposition 2 that in response to both positive and negative shocks, R becomes larger
than 1 (so that l > c), implying that with a negative shock, the response of labour
exceeds that of consumption in the event of a monetary expansion and falls short of it20 C. Ibanez
in a contraction. Note that as we have discuss in the previous section, this feature is
instrumental in determining the direction of the asymmetric in the response of output.
5. Dynamic Analysis
We consider ￿rst the dynamic response under the assumption that we have use so far:
those ￿rms that adjust prices maximise myopic pro￿ts. This solution of this model
does not involve numerical computations of any expectation terms. The solution of
the model is given by a non-linear solver that combines the equilibrium conditions of
the model. The accuracy level of the solution can be set arbitrarily high10. In the
￿rst period after the shock, the results of this model are identical to those we have
presented so far. We ￿rst consider and how the asymmetry evolves over time and
then reintroduce forward-looking behaviour in the analysis. In ￿gure 8, the solid line
corresponds to the response to the positive shock and the dashed one to the negative
one. We consider ￿rst the results for the aggregate amount of labour, the real wage
rate and the optimal price.
The response of the aggregate amount of labour in the ￿rst period is clearly asym-
metric, with the response to a positive shock exceeding the negative one (0:13%;￿0:10%).
The real wage rate again follows this asymmetric pattern (0:96%;￿0:82%), with its
response being signi￿cantly larger than labour￿ s because labour supply is inelastic (we
have set ￿l= ￿6:7). In the second period after the shock, a second round of adjustment
of prices causes both aggregates to quickly converge to their long-run steady state val-
ues. The response to both positive and negative shocks has reduced to (0:02%;￿0:01%)
for aggregate labour and (0:10%;￿0:10%) for the real wage rate. The optimal price
is set by adjusters at a constant markup over the wage rate. Thus, in the ￿rst period
after the shock it follows the wage rate￿ s asymmetric pattern (1:87%;￿1:69%). In the
second period, following again the wage rate￿ s, the response of the optimal price is
considerably reduced (1:10%;￿1:08%). It is thus very close in this second period to
its steady value (+1%;￿1%) and the asymmetry in its response has nearly vanished.
Convergence towards the steady state is quick for the three magnitudes: beyond the
second period they display close to negligible responses.
The asymmetry in the response of the optimal price (that adjusters set) generates a
far larger income e⁄ect for the positive shock than for a negative one. The response of
real aggregate demand departs in several respects from that of the other magnitudes we
have described. In the ￿rst period after the shock, it is asymmetric (0:10%;￿0:13%),
with the response to a negative shock 30% larger than to a positive one. Thus, the
response of real aggregate demand to a negative shock exceeds that to a positive one,
while the reverse is the case for the optimal price, aggregate labour and the real wage
rate. In the second period after the shock, the response of real aggregate demand to the
positive shock is close to negligible and it is very small for the negative one (￿0:03%).
As is well known (see Chari et al. (1999)), monetary shocks fail to produce persistent
movements of output in this model. As a result the asymmetry in the response of
output is also short-lived.
We can now introduce in our analysis the forward looking behaviour of ￿rms, re-
establishing (13), instead of (14) and so having ￿rms maximising an in￿nite sum of
expected future pro￿ts. Unlike the myopic ￿rms model, we need now to compute
10The tolerance level we set in our myopic ￿rms model is 10￿14.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 21
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to small ￿rst period shocks (’1 = ￿1%) in the myopic
￿rms model (￿l = ￿6:7, ￿c = 1, ￿ = 0:5).
numerically expectation terms. The results are obtained using two di⁄erent non-
linear numerical methods: the projection methods develop by Judd (1992) and the
Parameterised Expectations Approach of Den Haan and Marcet (1990), delivering very
close results11. Because ￿rms are now forward looking the response of the optimal price
has changed. We have drawn the response of the optimal price to ￿1% shocks in the
two models in the top panel of ￿gure 9.
The thin lines correspond to the response of the optimal price in the model where
￿rms maximise myopic pro￿ts (as in (14)) and the thick ones to the model where
they maximise an in￿nite discounted sum of future pro￿ts, as described in section
2. In the ￿rst period after the shock, the response of the optimal price when ￿rms
are forward looking (1:78%;￿1:62%) is more limited to both positive and negative
shocks than when they are myopic (1:87%;￿1:69%). Because they look ahead when
adjusting, they know the e⁄ects of the nominal shock are short-lived, and real activity
will progressively converge back to the steady state. As a result, the response of the
optimal price, which is a function of the future path of real activity, is smoothed out
relative to the myopic ￿rms case.
The price level records a parallel response, although more limited since some ￿rms
fail to adjust prices. Hence, real aggregate demand records a larger response to both
positive and negative shocks, as represented in ￿gure 9. With a positive shock, because
11In both methods we ￿t functional forms to the expectation terms, as a function the vector of
states given by gt, ~ Mt￿1=Pt￿1 and Rt￿1. The results of accuracy tests are described in the appendix.
We describe the solution method in a technical appendix, available from the author.22 C. Ibanez


























































































Figure 9: Comparison of myopic (thin lines) and forward-looking (thick ones) ￿rms
models with small ￿1% shocks. Optimal price responses in the top panel and output












fw p p -
Negative shock Positive shock
7 . 7 = q 2 . 8 = q 2 . 7 = q 2 . 6 - =
l
g 45 . 0 = h 7 . 6 - =
l
g 2 . 7 - =
l












fw p p -
Negative shock Positive shock
7 . 7 = q 2 . 8 = q 2 . 7 = q 2 . 6 - =
l
g 45 . 0 = h 7 . 6 - =
l
g 2 . 7 - =
l
g 50 . 0 = h 55 . 0 = h
Figure 10: Comparison of the myopic and forward-looking ￿rms models: ￿rst period
response to ￿1% nominal shocks. Unless otherwise speci￿ed: ￿ = 7:7, ￿l = ￿6:7,
￿ = 0:5 (middle bars in each grouping).
the response of the optimal price is more limited when ￿rms are forward-looking, its
income e⁄ect is weaker and real aggregate demand increases further than when ￿rms
are myopic. With a negative shock, the more limited response of the optimal price
level yields a weaker negative response of the price level, and so real aggregate demand
experiences a larger fall. Thus, forward looking behaviour magni￿es the impact of the
nominal shock on real aggregate demand.
Importantly, because the response of the optimal price is more limited when ￿rms
are forward-looking, the reallocation of demand becomes also less intense. Because the
reallocation of demand is at the origin of the asymmetric outcome of the model, the
introduction of forward-looking behaviour limits the size of the asymmetry. While the
￿rst period response of output with a negative ￿1% shock is 36% above the response
to the positive shock12 when ￿rms maximise myopic pro￿ts, it is only 20% when ￿rms
are forward-looking. In the second and subsequent periods, the response of the optimal
price is very close between the two models we are comparing (indistinguishable in the
top panelof ￿gure 9). However, a signi￿cant gap still remains between the responses of
real aggregate demand in the two models. While the asymmetry remains, it becomes
weaker as more ￿rms adjust prices.
We ￿nd that the more limited response of the optimal price when ￿rms are for-
ward looking than when they are myopic holds in small brackets around our chosen
parameter values13. We have represented in ￿gure 10 the absolute value of the change
in the ￿rst period￿ s response of the optimal price, for the same small variations from
our benchmark choice as before, from its forward looking value to its myopic one for
12Computed as 100 ￿ (￿^ c
￿





13However, this is not universally true. One can ￿nd combinations of parameter values for which
the response of the optimal price is actually larger when ￿rms are forward-looking.24 C. Ibanez
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Figure 11: Response of real aggregate demand in the ￿rst period to a range of shocks.
Myopic ￿rms in the ￿rst panel, forward-looking in the second (￿l = ￿6:7, ￿c = 1,
￿ = 0:5).








￿. It is consistently negative for positive
shocks and positive for negative ones: in both cases, the response is smaller when ￿rms
are forward looking than when they are myopic. However, the size of the change in
the response of the optimal price between the two models does vary signi￿cantly with
the value of the parameters.
Let us ￿nally consider the response of real aggregate demand for di⁄erent values of
the nominal shock. The ￿rst panel in ￿gure 11 corresponds to the ￿rst period response
when ￿rms are myopic, whereas the second corresponds to the forward-looking case.
Because the response of the optimal price is more limited when ￿rms are forward-
looking, the response of real aggregate demand to both positive and negative shocks is
larger. As a result, the introduction of forward-looking behaviour causes the response
to large positive shocks to be positive, instead of negative as in the myopic ￿rms case.
Also, the size of the asymmetry has reduced considerably, and the accuracy of the
log-linearisation has improved. A more limited response of the optimal price implies
a weaker reallocation of demand towards the cheaper goods, explaining both results.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that the introduction of nominal rigidities in a framework where
agents maximise their welfare leads to asymmetric e⁄ects of nominal aggregate demand
shocks. When labour supply is su¢ ciently inelastic, real aggregate demand records a
larger response with negative shocks. When labour supply is only mildly inelastic,
the response of real aggregate displays the opposite pattern: it is larger with positive
shocks. Finally, when the elasticity of substitution is small, positive shocks have sim-
ilar e⁄ects to negative ones. We show that the size of the asymmetry is signi￿cantly
reduced by the introduction of forward-looking behaviour. Finally, we illustrate the
important quantitative and qualitative di⁄erences between our non-linear solution and
the log-linearised one.Asymmetric Outcome of Sticky Prices Models 25
While studying the log-linearised version of the model has certain advantages, we
believe it has important drawbacks. While the loss in accuracy of the method is
small when the shock is, the loss in terms of our understanding of the forces driving
the model￿ s outcomes can actually be substantial. The new Keynesian Phillips curve
is a convenient reduced form of the log-linearised supply side of the model, apt to
be estimated or incorporated in a more complex framework. One of the claimed
advantages of using this relation is that it to is derived from solid microfoundations.
But the forces at work in the microfounded model are to a certain extent lost in its
ultimate log-linearised reduced form, thus limiting our capacity to understand them.
7. Appendix
7.1. Proof to proposition 2:. The ratio of the two price aggregators is larger
than one whenever some ￿rms set a di⁄erent price than the others: R > 1 if popt 6= ￿ p.
Proof. We want to prove that the ratio of the two price alternative price aggregators
satis￿es R > 1 when popt 6= ￿ p for ￿ p;popt > 0, ￿ > 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1. The ratio of the
two alternative price aggregators, R = P=P ￿ can be written, using (??) and (??) as:
R =
n
￿ ￿ (￿ p)
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De￿ne ￿rst d = popt=￿ p ￿ 1 > 0 and
S(d) =
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Rearranging R > 1,
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Therefore we need to prove that S(d) < 0. When popt = ￿ p, d = 0 and S(0) = 0
(R = 1). We then need to prove that @S=@d > 0 when d < 0 and @S=@d < 0 when
d > 0. We have that
@S(d)
@d
= ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
n





￿￿ +￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + d)
￿￿￿126 C. Ibanez
I need to prove that this derivative is larger than zero whenever d is:
@S(d)
@d
= ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
n
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(1 + d) since ￿ > 0, ￿ < 1
1 > (1 + d)
￿￿1 since ￿ > 1, ￿ < 1
Thus, @S=@d > 0 when d < 0 and @S=@d < 0 when d > 0, and so R > 1 when popt 6= ￿ p.
7.2. Accuracy tests. The degree of accuracy of the solution obtained varies with
the parameter values chosen and with the size and sign of the shock. While it is at its
highest with the parameter values that yield the analytical solution (￿c = 1, ￿l = 0,
￿ = 2), it falls as the homothopy reaches the more distant areas of the parameter
space.. Following Judd (1998) we can give the level of accuracy in economic terms
by calculating the one period optimisation error as a function of the nominal price
set. We give the results of the accuracy test on the response of the optimal price to
di⁄erent shocks sizes (both positive and negative) for di⁄erent values of the elasticity
of labour supply in table 1. We base these on the forward-looking impulse response
of the optimal price in section 5, for the ￿rst 8 periods after the shock. The degree of
accuracy is lowest when labour supply is inelastic, due to the fact that the functional
form we use to parameterise expectation has di¢ culties to absorb the non-linearity
in the model￿ s structure in this case, specially when the shock is large. In the worst
case represented in table 1, ￿rms make a 2:49% mistake when they set the optimal
price based on the functional forms used to approximate the expectations. This error
is small enough for our conclusions not to be a⁄ected by it.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Period
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0100% -0.1300% 0.1600% (-) shock
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.3400% 2.4900% (+) shock
gl=-6.7,|j|=5%
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0100% -0.1800% (-) shock
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0700% 0.3700% (+) shock
gl=-6.7,|j|=1%
-0.0050% -0.0050% -0.0050% -0.0051% -0.0052% -0.0057% -0.0075% -0.0009% (-) shock
-0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0046% -0.0050% -0.0066% -0.0071% (+) shock
gl=0,|j|=5%
-0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0049% -0.0050% -0.0042% (-) shock
-0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0055% (+) shock
gl=0,|j|=1%
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Period
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0100% -0.1300% 0.1600% (-) shock
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.0300% 0.3400% 2.4900% (+) shock
gl=-6.7,|j|=5%
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0300% 0.0100% -0.1800% (-) shock
0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0400% 0.0700% 0.3700% (+) shock
gl=-6.7,|j|=1%
-0.0050% -0.0050% -0.0050% -0.0051% -0.0052% -0.0057% -0.0075% -0.0009% (-) shock
-0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0045% -0.0046% -0.0050% -0.0066% -0.0071% (+) shock
gl=0,|j|=5%
-0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0048% -0.0049% -0.0050% -0.0042% (-) shock
-0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0047% -0.0055% (+) shock
gl=0,|j|=1%
Table 1: Accuracy in the computation of the optimal price
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